The Astros Paid the Most for Any Pitcher This Trade Deadline
The Astros Paid the Most for Any Pitcher This Trade Deadline
The Astros had to get a starting pitcher. Reviewing the rest of the starting pitching market, I think they targeted Kikuchi because his durability provides extra value to this team.
What did the Astros give up to acquire Yusei Kikuchi for the final two months of the 2024 season? On one hand, the answer is simple. They gave up starting pitcher Jake Bloss, outfielder Joey Loperfido and potential utility man in Will Wagner.
On the other, the answer is complicated. The Astros gave up three players of a particular type of potential. Could they have given up a different set of players and still landed Kikuchi? Should they have targeted a different starting pitcher than Kikuchi for the same trade package, or a different one?
The conventional wisdom that developed among Astros fans quickly after the deal was reported is that the Astros overpaid for Kikuchi, and that is before fans found out that Joey Loperfido (and Will Wagner) were in the deal. Is is true?
I decided to approach this question by comparing what the Astros gave up to what other teams gave up for starting pitchers at this year’s trade deadline.
I reach two clear conclusions:
the trade market was odd, as the pitchers closest to free agency fetched the most value in return, though they were objectively the best pitchers, and
the Astros gave up the most “prospect” value of any team at the deadline.
The Trade Market
In the table below, I list each of these five—Kikuchi, Jack Flaherty, Erick Fedde, Zach Eflin, and Trevor Rogers. I include a number of columns—who they were traded from, who they were traded to, how many playoff runs they have before becoming a free agent, their projected rest of season ERA from Steamer, and their trade return.
It is of course difficult to determine the actual value of a trade return for several reasons, and one of those is that there are few resources which measure prospects equally and comprehensively. For example MLB Pipeline has a Top 100 list that does this, but only for 100 players. Baseball America puts out a Top 30 list for each team, but each team’s list is not equal. And of course, some players who are traded no longer meet the official definition of “prospect.”
The best resource available for this is at Fangraphs, where they give a player’s “Future Value” a rating on the 20-to-80 scale favored by scouts. They do this for 1,213 prospects and 81 major leaguers who have recently “graduated” from this list. It still does not get every player who was traded, but is the best tool available.
Among the five top starting pitchers who were traded, you can see that the Astros gave up the most “future value” for their trade deadline acquisition of any of the teams buying a starting pitching. They gave up a 50 future value (Bloss), a 45 (Loperfido), and a 35+ in Wagner.
The only other team to give up a 50 future value player were the Dodgers, who gave up catcher Thayron Liranzo to the Tigers in the Jack Flaherty deal. Other teams did not give up such a promising prospect to get a starting pitcher. The Astros gave up three players, two of whom had reached the majors.
But what is most notable to me about the table is that team’s prioritized this season over future seasons. The most value was given up for the rentals (Kikuchi and Flaherty), while it took lesser packages to get the players who will be around in the future (Fedde, Eflin, and Rogers).
But if you look at the ERA column, it tells you that teams prioritized this season. The best projected players this season—which includes the new Astro Kikuchi—were traded for the most value. The market valued 2024 production and the Astros needed 2024 production. It is not surprising that they had to pay up.
Could the Astros Have Made a Different Deal?
I also look at the table and wonder what are the White Sox doing. I think projections underestimate his potential this season—he has a 3.11 ERA this season after turning his career around in the KBO in 2023 (he was league MVP). And the table undersells the value of his trade—Fedde was traded as part of a 3-team deal where the White Sox also shipped out outfielder Tommy Pham and reliever Michael Kopech. The two 40 Future Value players the White Sox received were A ball infielders who have already moved off of shortstop.
Which leads to an obvious question? Why didn’t the White Sox take the Astros offer? Did the Astros front office target Fedde and did they offer the same (or a similar) package to the White Sox? The White Sox should have taken the Astros offer and I said this before doing the research presented above.
I also really like the value proposition that Baltimore got in the Zach Eflin deal. For three mid-level prospects, they got a mid level starter who can be in their rotation for two seasons. I think Eflin will pitch better the rest of the season than he has so far, though that remains to be seen.1
I’m quite low on Trevor Rogers, as is the Steamer model, which shows him to be the worst of these five starting pitchers.
The Astros Targeted Kikuchi
In an interview this morning on Sports Talk 790, General Manager Dana Brown noted that “Kikuchi was a guy we definitely targeted." That seems to hold up with the analysis that I’ve done here.
The Astros seem to have targeted Kikuchi because they think he was the best pitcher on the market. That they were willing to give up more than other teams to get him obviously fits with this conclusion.
And one key reason that the Astros might have targeted Kikuchi is his durability. As I noted yesterday, Kikuchi has only been on the IL twice in his major league career, and one of those times was for one day after failing a COVID test in 2020. He has made 20 or more starts in every one of his full major league seasons.
And durability may have pushed the Astros away from the other high quality rental starter who moved—Jack Flaherty. Flaherty missed a start earlier in July and has received two injections recently. Last night, Ken Rosenthal of The Athletic reported that “the Yankees backed out of a preliminary trade agreement with the Detroit Tigers for Flaherty after reviewing the right-hander’s medical records.”
We do not know the Astros reaction to Flaherty’s injuries. Cody Stavenhagen, who is the Tigers beat reporter for The Athletic, wrote that “the Tigers are thought to have discussed a similar pool of players with the Astros” in Flaherty discussion. But the talks did not progress to the point where the Astros reviewed Flaherty’s medical record—Rosenthal reported that only the Yankees and Dodgers did that.
It’s possible the Astros wanted to avoid a risky starting pitcher after so many injuries to their starting pitching this season and the fact they were trading away a starter in Jake Bloss. We don’t know that for sure.
What we do know is that the Astros entered the trade deadline with what I wrote was “a massive need for starting pitching. They can muddle through everything else, but they have to get a starting pitcher.”
The other thing that affected the Astros decision making was the fact they had to get starting pitching and that their potential trade partners knew that as well as you and I do. It likely tipped the scales to the Astros pushing more chips in than they would have liked.
Was it worth it? Well, it depends on what happens with the rest of the careers of Jake Bloss, Joey Loperfido, and Will Wagner. But mostly it rest on what Yusei Kikuchi does in the Orange and Blue for the next 2+ months. The Astros needed rotation help to get them to the playoffs this season. Kikuchi needs to help them get there.
My fantasy team certainly hopes so.